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Abstract
The success of the CD has (partly) been attributed to the ability of Sony,
Philips and Matsushita to cooperate in the run-up to the DAD conference in 1981,
where the technological standard was set. We model the situation leading up to
the conference in a simple game with technological progress and the possibility
of prelaunching a technology. We identify players' tradeos between prelaunching
(which ends technological progress) and continued development (which involves the
risk of being pre-empted). Contrasting outcomes with complete and incomplete
information, we nd that there appeared to be considerable uncertainty about
rivals' technological progress.
1 Introduction
Standardization is important whenever strong network eects operate and (potential)
user benets crucially depend on the interoperability of components. With the emer-
gence of modern information and telecommunication technologies and the convergence
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of related industries including the computer and software industries, telecommunication
and consumer electronics, compatibility standards have consistently been subject to aca-
demic attention (Besen and Saloner, 1989; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Weitzel, 2004).
A large number of theoretical as well as empirical studies have studied standardization
processes in detail.1 Key issues in this research are the identication of circumstances
under which standardization is (socially or privately) desirable, and the characterization
of (however dened) appropriate ways to achieve a standard. Clearly, there is a lot to
learn from the study of past (successful or unsuccessful) standardization processes. In
this paper, we focus on the introduction of the compact disc (CD) and explore how
coalition formation, prelaunch strategies and technological progress may have aected
its success.
The introduction of the CD was a particularly successful standardization process in
terms of its smoothness and speed. The process displayed a set of action typically at-
tributed to two fundamentally dierent (and mutually exclusive) types of standardization
processes; de facto standardization through market mechanisms, and formal standard-
ization through explicit agreements in committees and industry consortia (Farrell and
Saloner, 1988). While in the former, a standard emerges from competition between dif-
ferent technical solutions in the marketplace, the latter refers to the denition of a stan-
dard prior to its commercialization. An increasing number of standardization processes
however cannot be placed squarely in either of the two categories. Recent theoretical as
well as empirical contributions to the standardization literature have started studying
such forms of "hybrid standardization" (see e.g. Farrell and Saloner, 1988; David and
Monroe, 1994; Funk and Methe, 2001; Funk, 2002; Keil, 2002) and have identied sev-
eral stylized facts related to hybrid standardization. In their seminal paper, Farrell and
Saloner (1988) show that hybrid standardization processes may be superior to either
of the pure mechanisms, market or committee. The main driver of this result is that
the rms interested in setting a standard have two opportunities for coordination in
each period: the market and the committee. Coordination is therefore achieved more
frequently than with the market mechanism alone, and faster than by solely using the
committee mechanism.
The Compact Disc standard appears to have been much smoother than some stan-
dards battles in similar technologies,2 but also much quicker than many of the standard-
setting committees { for instance, the average time for agreement on an IEEE standard
is 7 years (Spring et al., 1995). Other authors have focused on other features of the
CD industry, such as the capacity investments by major players in introducing the tech-
1From a conceptual perspective, see e.g. Kindleberger, 1983; Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz
and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; David and Greenstein, 1990; Besen and Farrell, 1994; Axelrod et al., 1995;
from an empirical perspective, see e.g. Weiss and Sirbu, 1990; Funk and Methe, 2001; Keil, 2002;
Dranove and Gandal, 2003.
2For example, even though the VHS-Betamax standards did end up with a winner, Sony, owner of
the the losing technology, incurred substantial losses in the process (Ohashi, 2003, Park, 2003).
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nology in the US market (McGahan, 1993), the existence of indirect network eects
(Gandal et al., 2000) and the comparison with similar, but unsuccessful, technologies
(Rohlfs, 2001). Our paper focuses on the CD standardization process in particular.
Building a simple model of standard-setting with technological progress, we nd that
it may have been precisely the mixture of market elements (in the form of a product
prelaunch) and committee elements (in the form of the industry's approval conference)
that contributed to the success of the outcome. We are especially interested in studying
the various motives for a prelaunch. In particular, it is interesting to see if the prelaunch
in this particular case predominantly revealed the prelaunching rms' type or if there
are some extraneous benets to a prelaunch (for instance, through enlarging the action
space { making concession possible { and, thereby, creating the possibility of an increase
in the total size of the prize to be gained).3
In our analysis, we focus on the time period prior to the widespread agreement on
the Philips/Sony solution, i.e. the standard's development process which was completed
by its approval at the Digital Audio Disc (DAD) conference in Japan in April 1981. We
choose this event even though the approval forum at the conference actually approved of
two dierent solutions (the Philips/Sony technology, and also the technology proposed
by JVC) and despite the fact this approval represented just the prelude for the actual
establishment in the market place (which followed rather quickly). However, evidence
from the case as well as an analysis of the agents' incentives suggest that in fact just one
viable technology (the Philips/Sony standard which survives to this day) emerged from
the conference. Neither of the unapproved technologies nor JVC's approved technology
ever got to the market.
The paper is structured as follows. We summarize the main facts of the CD case in
Section 2.4 We then introduce the basic model in Section 3 and relate the results of our
model to the CD case in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Introducing the Compact Disc
The invention of the phonograph by Thomas Edison in 1877 marked the rst audio
recording technology. It was only in the 1940's however when the long-playing record
(LP) as well as the magnetic tape were created and enabled widespread use of audio
technology by nal consumers. By the late 1970's, analog technologies had reached their
limits: among other problems, analog recordings had a very limited dynamic range5 and
3In this sense, our paper is related to a recent paper by Hoerner and Sahuguet (2004) which extends
a classic war of attrition to allow for a wider action space beyond the binary choice between "wait" and
"concede".
4For a more detailed account of the case see e.g. Gamharter 2004).
5The dynamic ranges indicates the range of frequencies that a sound medium covers. A larger
dynamic range implies that hardly (but still) audible signals are reproduced, resulting in better sound
3
suered from quality losses associated with the master recording process and wear and
tear during use. Increasing recognition of these inherent limitations triggered the dawn
of a new audio playback standard for the mass consumer market: the Compact Disc
Digital Audio System, or CD.6
2.1 A new technology
Enhanced audio technology sparked worldwide developer interest: Nearly all major (and
some minor) consumer electronics manufacturers became increasingly committed to re-
search and development in search of a new audio playback technology in the late 1960s
and 1970s. Among the main players were Philips N.V. from the Netherlands, Sony
Corporation (Japan), The Victor Company of Japan Ltd. (JVC) and its parent rm
Matsushita, as well as Telefunken/Decca (German Teledec). RCA (USA) and Thomp-
son (France) were also working on enhanced video systems and were hence at least at
the periphery involved in the development of an enhanced audio format. In 1977, sev-
eral rms (Mitsubishi, Sony and Hitachi) presented early versions of digital audio discs
and players at the Tokyo Audio Fair. Dierent technological trajectories were pursued:
Telefunken, for instance, worked on a mechanical system ("Mini Disc") with informa-
tion engraved in grooves similar to phonograph records. JVC's system ("Audio High
Density") was based on magnetic scanning. Philips developed an optical disc system
based on an early prototype of the VideoDisc7 using a digital code instead of putting
an analog picture onto the disc. Philips then announced its rst digital Compact Disc
Audio System, a 110mm optical disc, in May 1978. Sony as well was experimenting with
an optical system to record digital audio.
Despite all these diverse and initially dispersed eorts, there was a strong belief
from the outset that, in view of the large installed base of the LP and magnetic tape
technologies, joint eorts would be required in order to assert any new audio playback
format. In particular, getting the new technology adopted in the popular segment was
a major source of concern (McGahan, 1993) { a belief that may retrospectively appear
surprising given the success of` the CD and evidence suggesting that CD technology
actually possessed several features that made it particularly attractive to nal users in
the popular segment (e.g. remote control, possibilities of programming sequences of
titles, no need to reverse/repeat options, and the possibility of using the same software
for home use and en-route). Winning over this segment which was much larger compared
quality.
6In fact, digital audio had rst been developed by Thomas Stockman at MIT in the early 1960's.
Through his company, Soundstream Inc., he also pioneered the commercialization of digital sound
recording. The technology's target in these early days however was clearly professional use, for instance
by large broadcasting and production houses.
7The VideoDisc, based on digital signals, was introduced by Philips in the 1970s and failed dismally.
Only 1000 players were ever sold.
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to the other basic group, the classical segment was, however, considered crucial for the
establishment of a new industry standard. In addition, the experience from recent
standards battles was still fresh for some of the involved rms. In the well-documented
video wars, Sony had just lost out with its Betamax technology to JVC's VHS system.
Philips, on the other hand, had been successful in setting the de facto industry standard
for the compact cassette in 1963 against the German consumer electronics manufacturer
Grundig { by means of a strategic alliance with Sony. In view of these experiences,
as well as concerns regarding the adoption by software producers and nal consumers
and in recognition of the complementarity of their particular elds of strength in this
development process, two of the main players nally teamed up in 1979: Philips and Sony
signed an agreement to jointly develop a technical standard for digital audio playback.
2.2 Introducing a new technology
There are three stages at which standardization decisions can be taken. The development
stage of a new technology, the approval, or committee phase, and the commercialization
phase. Agreeing on a standard in each (or more) of the stages has its own advantages and
disadvantages. Standardization in the rst stage is equivalent to foregoing development
of competing, incompatible technologies, which carries a technological opportunity cost
(since it is not clear that the chosen technology is the ecient one). On the other
hand, rms avoid duplicating development cost, and rms might benet from knowledge
sharing (Cabral, 2000). Standardization through committees has been studied in detail
by Farrell and Saloner (1988). Their general intuition is that nding a common solution
might be time-consuming, but will likely lead to a more ecient solution than market-
based standardization. Finally, standard battles (i.e. de facto standardization on the
market) may still generate inecient outcomes and is likely to be very costly for sponsors
of a particular standard. The following sections outline the events in these three stages
in the particular case of the CD launch. Our emphasis however will be on the rst
two stages, since we are especially interested in the way standardization took place.
A detailed presentation and analysis of the commercialization of the CD is McGahan
(1993).
2.2.1 The development phase
Philips and Sony teamed up in the rst phase to form a technology development alliance.
Philips' initial approach had been based on the (analog) VideoDisc. As the human
ear is more sensitive to quality aws than the human eye however, this approach kept
delivering unsatisfactory results. As a result, Philips turned towards digital recording.
In 1974, Philips started working towards recording music digitally and reading the data
by an optical signal, thereby avoiding wear and tear. Yet, digital code turned out to
be much more error-sensitive than analog data, resulting in undesirable playback errors.
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Despite its expertise in the optical domain and with the precision mechanics of the
system, Philips recognized that it lacked expertise in the coding of digital information
and error correction systems. Hence, for technological as well as strategic reasons, a
strategic alliance seemed attractive. From these considerations, Sony emerged as the
strategic partner in the technological development process. Philips and Sony, although
competitors in many areas, shared a long history of cooperation, for instance in the joint
establishment of the compact cassette standard in the 1960's. In their initial forays into
digital audio, Sony specically focused on the development of signal error correction
technology, that is, an error protection code that allows for detection, correction or
concealment of (inevitable) recording errors { precisely the area which Philips was lacking
expertise in. Also on both rms' minds was that by teaming up they each eliminated a
formidable competitor (McGahan, 1993; Besen and Farrell, 1994).
Meetings in 1978 at which Philips at least partly revealed its audio digital disc tech-
nology set the stage for an agreement that was signed in October 1979 at which both
rms agreed to jointly develop a digital audio playback technology and attempt to estab-
lish it as a standard. In marketing the nal products however both rms would compete
against each other again. Philips brought its expertise in opto-electronics and some
basic patents from its LaserDisc development to the alliance, while Sony contributed its
advanced error correction system. In addition, both rms had a presence in the music
industry via CBS/Sony, a joint venture between CBS Inc. and Sony Japan Records Inc.
dating from the late 1960s, and Polygram, a 50% subsidiary of Philips. Both music com-
panies were basically engaged on all relevant stages of music production from planning
to recording, promotion and sales. Winning the music industry's support for the new
technology was essential: without sucient music available in the new format, there
would be no chance for widespread adoption by nal consumers with sizeable LP and
tape libraries. In 1983, 915 in 1000 UK households owned record and/or tape playback
equipment (BPI Yearbook 1992). Strong indirect network eects and (sunk) investments
in incompatible software libraries implied the presence of signicant switching costs.
After the agreement had been signed, research teams of Philips and Sony entered
into negotiations over the technological properties of the jointly developed disc. In the
development process, they faced a trade-o. On the one hand, extensive development
times meant maximizing the quality of the technology and thereby maximizing chances
of approval at the upcoming DAD conference and gaining the support of other consumer
electronics manufacturers. On the other hand, bringing the technology on the market
quickly seemed attractive due to the danger of preemption by other manufacturers devel-
oping competing systems. In June 1980, the exact specications werde determined. They
were documented in the System Description Compact Disc Digital Audio, the so-called
Redbook, to ensure that all software produced for this technology (the Compact Disc
Digital Audio technology) could be played on all pieces of hardware (the corresponding
players). The Redbook addressed not only static compatibility, but also ensured (back-
ward) compatibility of future hard- and software manufactured within the standard. The
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publication of the Redbook a year before the DAD conference eectively prelaunched
the technology { its fundamental properties became xed and common knowledge. To
some extent, it even went beyond an ordinary product prelaunch since, although neither
of the developers had presented a workable product by that time, they soon started
licensing the technology to industry players at relatively low rates. As a result, by late
1981 Philips/Sony had already granted licenses for the development of CD-compatible
products to 30 audio equipment manufacturers and 8 record replicators. The licensing
strategy adopted was inuenced by two main objectives: broadening the support base
for the technology (by oering favourable licensing terms), and protecting compatibility
(by insisting on compliance with the Redbook). The launch of the Redbook was fol-
lowed by announcements by both Philips and Sony to present individual prototypes at
the 29th Japan Audio Fair in October 1981.8
2.2.2 The approval phase
Approval of the new audion standard took place at the DAD Conference in Japan in
April 1981. Organized by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) with the explicit aim of dening a digital audio standard, it had been put in place
already in 1978 and was attended by 29 consumer electronics manufacturers. The aim
was to lay the ground for establishing a new audio standard: based on the approval, rst
the support of the relevant software producers, mainly the music industry and record
manufacturers, had to be gained. Later, with hardware and a certain amount of software
available, nal consumers would be targeted. The DAD conference eventually approved
two technologies: Philips/Sony and JVC. Telefunken's proposal for a mechanical system
was not approved. Despite the DAD's approval however, JVC's technology never made it
to the market. While the conference had been scheduled in 1978 already and took place in
April 1981, it was eectively preempted by the events between June 1980 (submission and
publication of the Redbook) and January 1981 when Matsushita, the parent company
of JVC, announced its intention to support the Philips/Sony technology. This latter
date in particular marked the real turning point since from then onwards, the CD was
supported by the three largest consumer electronic rms (Dai, 1996).
The fact that only one technology was commercialized subsequent to the DAD con-
ference certainly smoothened the standard-setting process in hindsight. By no means
however was it already clear at that point, that the technology that had managed to
throw several other new technologies out of the race would also be a success when racing
against the LP and the compact cassette.
8Press release Nr. 8403E, October 1980, by Philips Press Oce.
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2.2.3 The commercialization phase
The licensing policy adopted by Philips/Sony was probably inuenced both by Philips'
successful licensing of the compact cassette standard and Sony's negative experience
in the VCR standards battle where they, as sponsors of Betamax, lost out against a
heavily licensed technology (VHS) with its corresponding advantages in terms of critical
mass and lower prices. Although winning the support of other hardware manufacturers
seemed relatively simple, initial acceptance by software producers, i.e. the music industry
(software content) and record manufacturers (physical elements of software) was sluggish.
Partly, this stemmed from the new technology's lack of a built-in copy protection device,
partly from the fact that the industry had just recently invested heavily in expanding and
improving production facilities for the old technology, and partly from the requirement
to pay royalties (however low) to Philips/Sony for both hard- and software production {
after all, licenses for the compact cassette standard a few years prior had been granted
freely by Philips. Finally, rms in the music and recording industry were skeptical about
adoption among nal consumers in the mass market because of the high initial price and
recent experiences of failed consumer electronics technologies.9 Therefore, any initial
momentum in the software area had to come from software producers that had some link
to the standard sponsors.10 On October 1, 1982, Sony launched the rst commercially
available CD player, the CDP-101. Philips followed a month later with the CD player
"Pinkeltje". The initial product launch in Japan and Europe was followed by the US
launch in early 1983. The set of the rst 50 CDs included classical as well as popular
and rock releases. Both Philips and Sony ran extensive marketing campaigns aimed at
increasing awareness among nal consumers, getting them to experience the technology
and shaping expectations, i.e. establishing the CD as the technology of the future in
consumers' minds. Despite being competitors in the market place, there was a strong
impetus to promote not only their own products but also the generic technology in order
to establish it as the new industry standard. In spite of the initial scarcity in software,
adoption by nal consumers was fast and widespread. Increased sound quality, but
also ease of use and many convenient functional features won over the popular segment
in particular much faster than expected by many industry participants and observers
(McGahan, 1993). Prior to its introduction in 1982, Philips/Sony had been hoping that
somewhat more than 10m CDs would be sold worldwide in 1985. Within a year, they
revised their forecasts to 15m CDs. Actual sales of CDs in 1985 were 59m.
Viewed historically, the introduction of the CD seems straightforward. Philips has
9The failure of quadraphonic sound was only a few years back and fresh in producers' minds (Postrel,
1990), as was the VideoDisc unsuccessfully introduced by Philips.
10Not surprisingly, 97 out of the 107 CD titles available in 1983 were supplied by CBS/Sony and
Polydor K.K. (an aliate of Polygram GmbH, W. Germany). The scarcity of software was short-lived
however: by 1985, approximately 1750 classical titles and 3250 pop titles were available on CD (see
BPI Yearbooks 1986 and 1987 for more detailed data).
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even been likened to "a virtuoso who makes a very dicult piece seem easy" (Rohlfs,
2001, p. 91). Nevertheless, players faced signicant uncertainty about strategies and
their likely outcomes. Aware that replacing an ubiquitous industry standard involved
high risk, but high potential rewards, all industry participants took actions that may
seem rational once the complete picture is known, but had to be taken with a degree of
uncertainty both about future payos and likely actions by their rivals. For example,
why did Philips/Sony publish the Redbook quite some time before the DAD conference,
risking premature commitment to a potentially inecient technology? Similarly, why
did JVC/Matsushita announce its intentions to support Sony/Philips' standard months
before the DAD conference? After all, by continuing development of their own technology
they might have been successful in asserting theirs as a standard.11. We will address
these and related questions in the following simple model.
3 The Model
We start with a general formulation of our model. Two risk neutral players i; j compete
for the highest share of a divisible (common-value) prize. The overall size of the prize
depends on three factors: market size X, product quality of the (weakly) superior tech-
nology q = max (qi; qj), and cooperation or concession benets . The total size of the
prize is  (; q;X).
Suppose that there are two stages, a development and a bargaining stage:
1. Development stage. In the rst stage, both technologies improve exogenously over
time, i.e., @qi
@t
> 0. We use a continuous time setting. Development ends at
t = T , so that qi;max = qi;T . A better technology will have a higher chance of
being accepted in the marketplace, i.e. post-introduction.12 This gives players
an incentive to wait until T to introduce their technology. On the other hand,
committing to one's own technology rst (i.e. before the other player does) may
confer pre-introduction advantages, which gives players an incentive to preempt
each other. When rms cooperate, payos increase increase by a factor   1.
The longer the players cooperate in the run-up to the bargaining stage, the higher
the benet, i.e. @
@t
 0. We ignore discounting.13
11The fact that both Philips/Sony's and JVC's technology were approved suggests that the quality
of JVC's technology exceeded a certain absolute quality threshold, which rules out the most convenient
answer to JVC's dilemma, namely that their technology was simply a "dead duck" without any potential
for commercialization.
12We model this as market prots being an increasing function of product quality. This is of course
identical to modelling the probability of acceptance as an increasing function of product quality.
13This is a sensible assumption since up to T , the players compete for claims to the nal prize rather
than the nal prize itself. Claims that are acquired earlier are no more valuable to the players than
those acquired closer to the deadline T .
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2. Bargaining stage. After T both players start bargaining over the distribution of
prots. We assume that the bargaining strengths are aected by their respective
qualities, i.e. @i
@qi
 0, @i
@qj
 0.
The players' strategy space is determined by the previous history of the game: If no
action has been taken, a player can choose to stay in (S) and continue developing the
own technology or prelaunch (P ) her own technology. If a prelaunch has taken place,
a player can concede (C) or stay in (S). Each player can move (i.e. play P or C) only
once. S is straightforward in its implications: The technology in question improves over
time, and there are no changes in payos otherwise. The other strategies are described
in more detail below.
 Prelaunch. Prelaunching one's technology ends technological progress. Essentially,
by prelaunching the player commits to implementing a technology conforming to
the specications set out in the prelaunch. Prelaunching is possible at any time
between 0 and T . We normalize the time horizon of the development game to 1,
i.e. T = 1.
 Concede. Conceding is only possible after a prelaunch has taken place.14 C implies
that the player stops development on the own technology and starts supporting the
rival standard. This implies being awarded the smaller share of the prize (1  ),
but it gives rise to concession benets . In other words, a player conceding will
obtain a smaller share of a larger pie. The assumption that concession benets
decrease over time implies that, if concession takes place at all, it will take place
immediately following a prelaunch.15 If no concession takes place throughout the
game,  = 1.
3.1 Payos
Suppose now that a prelaunch by rm i was successful, i.e. rm j conceded immediately
thereafter. Firm i's payos are i = i (ti; qi; ; ;X). The remainder, (1  ), will be
rm j's payo.
We use specic functional forms for the elements of our payo function. Where our
assumptions are restrictive in a sense that alternative specications generate dierent
outcomes, we will discuss this in Section 4.
 Overall market size (X). For simplicity, we normalize X = 1.
14In our model, we assume that technologies improve exogenously and costlessly over time. This
implies that C is dominated by S as long as prots in the bargaining stage increase in the technology's
quality. Therefore, our assumption that C is only available after a prelaunch is not restrictive.
15Note that this may not hold true with stochastic technological progress, in which case it may be
optimal to stay in for some more time.
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 Winner's share (). We assume that the winner is whoever has the better tech-
nology at T or whose technology has been accepted as the industry standard. The
winner's share is assumed to be  > 1
2
, the loser's (1  ), and independent of the
time of standardization or the dierence in qualities. If both technologies are of
equal quality, both players share the market.
 Technological quality (qi;t). We assume that there are two dierent speeds of devel-
opment (s low and f ast) and that technologies develop linearly. This means that
we can write qi;t = diti, di 2 [s; f ].
 Concession benets ((t) = t). Concession benets are assumed to be decreasing
linearly over time, and assumed to exceed the payos from not conceding (1) at
the end of the development stage. The assumption of decreasing benets over
time seems realistic: prior to the bargaining stage at T , the earlier both rms
join forces, the less R&D costs are duplicated, the more time the coalition has to
exert inuence on third parties in favour of their technology, the more time third
parties have to adapt their products to the technology, etc.. The assumption that
concession still conveys benets at T can also be justied on the grounds that prior
to bargaining for a standard, a pre-negotiation agreement will still save the time
and eort of negotiating. The simplest specication of this scenario of concession
benets is t =M   t, M > 2.
 Market prots (). Finally, we assume that our market prot function is multi-
plicative, i.e.  = qX.
3.2 Equilibrium
 Bargaining stage
If no agreement on either one of the technological solutions has been achieved until
T , the players bargain over the distribution of prots during a single round (the approval
conference). The general structure of our bargaining stage is very simple and basically a
version of "Splitting the pie" (e.g. Rasmusen, 2001): Two players choose shares !i; !j of
the total prize. We assume that the bargaining strengths are aected by their respective
qualities, i.e. @i
@qi
 0, @i
@qj
 0. At the start of the bargaining stage (i.e. the approval
conference) at the latest, the qualities of the players' technologies are made publicly
known, i.e. become common knowledge. We distinguish between two cases:
1. Both players' technologies have the same quality at T (qi = qj) and, hence, equal
bargaining strength. Both players choose simultaneously. If !i + !j = 1, each
player obtains its chosen share. If !i + !j > 1, both players get zero (failure to
achieve agreement, which leads, e.g. to a standards battle in the market place).
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The game has a continuum of Nash equilibria with any strategy combination
(!i; !j) such that !i + !j = 1 representing a Nash equilibrium. However, there
is one strategy combination which represents a focal point and unique symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium (in a continuous strategy space), (1
2
; 1
2
).
2. Players' technologies dier in their quality at T (qi 6= qj) and, therefore, also in
their bargaining strengths. Players move sequentially. Superior technology gives
a player (e.g. player i if qi > qj) with the ability to move rst. We assume
 (exogenously given for now) to represent the maximum share a player can ask
for.16 Again, if !i+!j = 1, each player obtains its chosen share. If !i+!j > 1, both
players get zero. The unique Nash equilibrium is (; 1 ) where !i = ; !j = 1 .
 Development stage
We solve the game by backward induction. For the second mover, we derive a
concession condition (CC) which gives parameter constellations for , , qi and ti for
which the follower, after a prelaunch, will want to concede or stay in until the end. The
(prospective) rst mover then takes this into account in the decision whether and when
to prelaunch. That is, we look for the prelaunch condition (PC) for the prospective rst
mover.
3.2.1 Stackelberg Leadership
We rst analyze the case in which rm i is a Stackelberg leader and can initiate a
prelaunch. Firm j can only decide whether to concede or stay in if a prelaunch has
taken place. If both players are of the same type (i.e. di = dj), we obtain the following
proposition (which follows from the algebra below):
Proposition 1 With Stackelberg leadership and symmetric types, the leader will only
prelaunch if the follower concedes. If not, both players will stay in until time T . If a
prelaunch takes place, it will be at the ecient time.
The intuition of this result is quite simple. If both the leader and the follower would
benet from agreeing on a standard prior to introduction, they will do so at the most
ecient time. In this case, the follower concedes because it is privately optimal to do
so, and the leader will maximize its payos by maximizing its share of the prize, ,
16An alternative way of modeling would be to have bargaining strengths determined by the players'
respective qualities. For instance, we could dene player i 's bargaining strength bi =
qi
qi+qj
. This would
also allow us to characterize the player's shares ; (1   ) at the development stage as a function of
their technologies' qualities, i.e. for bi > bj )  = bi = qiqi+qj and for bi < bj )  = bj =
qj
qi+qj
. This
would allow for more parsimonious modeling. We therefore plan to extend our analysis to include this
modication but do not expect qualitative changes to our current results.
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which amounts to maximizing overall payos . On the other hand, the follower would
only refuse to concede if it ends up winning, i.e. if qi;t < qj;T , in which case the leader is
better o ensuring a share 1
2
of prots rather than (1  ).
The concession condition is determined by the relative strength of concession benets
 and winner's share . If concession benets are relatively small and the winner's share
is large, the follower is less likely to concede.
We derive the concession and prelaunch conditions below. Player j concedes if
i(C)  i(S), i.e.
qi;titi (1  )  qj;T .
The concession payo is simply the smaller share of total payos from a technology
prelaunched and agreed on at ti. The payo from staying in until T is the winner's share
of a technology that has been developed until T . The concession condition is therefore
  C = ti (M   ti)
ti (M   ti) + 1
This upper bound for the winner's share is increasing in ti and M , which is intuitive
{ if the follower's technology has less time left to leapfrog the leader's, or if the benets
from concession are high, the follower will be content with a lower share of overall prots.
Note also that for allM  2 the Stackelberg leader chould choose an endogeneous   1
2
to ensure that the follower concedes. We can express CC also in terms of the earliest
time ti at which a prelaunch would trigger concession (tminC):
17
ti  tminC =  M
2
+
s
M2
4
+

(1  )
Turning to the prelaunch condition, we require i(P )  i(S), or
qi;titi 
qi;T
2
for symmetric players (di = dj). Note that a prelaunch would never be chosen if
 > C .
18 In this case, staying in would be the equilibrium strategy for the Stackelberg
17For M > 2, the alternative solution tAminC   M2  
q
M2
4 +

(1 ) never yields a time ti within
the permissible range of values. As a result, if there is valid solution at all, it is always given by our
expression of CC.
18To complete the proof, we need to show that in equilibrium, the Stackelberg leader never chooses an
unsuccessful prelaunch PU , i.e. never chooses prelaunch if it does not trigger concession by the follower.
Suppose the Stackelberg leader i would choose PU in equilibrium. This requires i(PU )  i(S), or
qj;T (1  )  12 qi;T , which implies   12 . By denition, this only holds for  = 12 . In that case, i is
indierent between S and P . Note that, i is indierent between all prelaunch times ti because they all
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leader. We rewrite the preliminary prelaunch condition PC1 as follows:
  P = 1
2ti (M   ti)
This is decreasing in ti: The later in the game, the smaller the winner's share can
be to support a protable prelaunch. The intuition is that a prelaunch at later stages
implies less foregone tchnological progress, i.e. less foregone increase in the total size
of the prize until T . Since this foregone improvement needs to be (over-) compensated
by a higher share ( compared to 1
2
), at later stages smaller  will make a prelaunch
protable. We can express PC1 as well in terms of the prelaunch time and nd the
earliest time ti that satises the PC1 (tminP ) from:
19
ti  tminP = M
2
 
r
M2
4
  1
2
Combining the PC1 and CC conditions, we obtain the following illustrative graph
(for M = 3):
Of the two conditions, CC is the binding constraint. That is, for each time that CC
holds, PC1 holds as well, but not vice versa. Hence, the binding prelaunch condition
PC2 in this case equals CC. Now given that these two conditions are satised, when
is the ecient prelaunch time ti ? With the specic functional forms we use, t

i is at T ,
since there will still be benets from prelaunching, but technological progress will have
been maximized. If player i is the Stackelberg leader, i maximizes maxi(P ),i.e.
max qi;titi = max diti(M   ti)
It is easy to see that this yields the optimal prelaunch time ti = T for all development
speeds (as long as PC2 holds at all during the interval [0; T ]).
yield the same payo. What about the follower j? The above reasoning requires j (for  = 12 ) to have
j(S)  j(C) i.e. qj;T2 
qi;tP 
2 or, for our specic functional forms,
1
tP
+ tP M . Since M > 2, there
exists at least one time bti(= 1) for which this does not hold, i.e. if player i was to prelaunch at bti, j
would concede because C and S get j the same share of the prize (because of  = 12 ), but concession
benets still accrue. This in turn aects player i: i can obtain a higher payo than i(PU ) =
qTj
2 by
undertaking a prelaunch at bti instead of earlier times. Hence, player i prefers prelaunching at bti to
an (unsuccessful) earlier prelaunch. Consequently, the Stackelberg will never choose an unsuccessful
prelaunch in equilibrium.
19For M > 2, the alternative solution tAminP  M2 +
q
M2
4   12 never yields a time ti within the
feasible range of values. As a result, if there is valid solution at all, it is always given by our expression
of PC1.
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Figure 1: Prelaunch and concession conditions
If the Stackelberg leader prelaunches, the prelaunch will take place at ti = 1 and j
concedes at the same time.20 Note that for M = 3 and  = 3
5
, the earliest time when
both PC1 and CC are met is tminP;C  :63, but the existence of Stackelberg leadership
ensures that the prelaunch takes place at the prot-maximizing time. In other words,
the absence of any threat of preemption ensures the ecient outcome if such an outcome
can be achieved in the rst place.
So far, our assumption was that both players are symmetric in their technological
capabilities. We now analyze the impact of technological asymmetry on the outcome of
our game with a Stackelberg leader. Suppose rst that the leader has the more ecient
technology, i.e. di = f , dj = s. We rst consider the prelaunch condition PC1. For
qi > qj, the prelaunch condition is independent of : M > t+
1
t
. This is a consequence
of the imposed Stackelberg leadership: knowing that it will not be preempted, rm i
is certain of the winner's share. Prelaunching in general then is protable whenever
the (induced concession) benets are suciently large to oset the lost technological
progress. Consequently, if M > 2 (so that there are some prelaunch benets even at
t ! 1), the prelaunch condition will be met at the very end of the game at least. The
leader i is certain to undertake a prelaunch at some ti 2 [0; T ]. Unlike with symmetric
types, a prelaunch (followed by concession) is certain to take place. Turning to the
concession condition, we can identify prelaunch times (before T ) for which the follower
20In our model, since concession benets  increase with distance from T , early concession is strictly
favoured over later concession, if CC is met at all in the interval leading up to T . Hence, if player i
concedes at all, then tP = tC .
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will concede. We then derive the following concession condition CC
for qj;T > qi;ti :   
0
C =
dititi
dititi + dj
which is less binding than in the symmetric case (for qj;T < qi;ti , player j always
concedes).21 With our specication of (t) = M   t, we obtain a more clear cut result.
The optimal prelaunch time ti coincides with the latest possible time for a prelaunch,
i.e. ti = T . As a result, in equilibrium player i always undertakes a prelaunch at t

i = T
and player j always concedes, i.e. qj;T < qi;ti .
Suppose now that the leader i has the less ecient technology, i.e. di = s, dj = f .
The concession condition CC becomes:
  
00
C =
diti (M   ti)
diti (M   ti) + dj ,
which is more stringent than in the symmetric case since dj > di { it takes a higher
share of the payos to make the follower sacrice her own (superior) standard. Turning
to the prelaunch condition PC1, we nd that for di = s, dj = f
  
00
P =
dj
diti (M   ti) + dj :
Depending on the value of titi, this condition may either be stricter or less strict than
with symmetric types Stackelberg leadership. For  = (M t), we know that ti = T = 1.
This allows us to derive a well-dened relationship: For di = s, dj = f , 
00
P > P , which
implies that a higher winner's share is required to make a prelaunch protable for the
less ecient Stackelberg leader. As the rival technology is superior, this makes sense:
By (succesfully) prelaunching, the leader increases its share of the pie (from (1   ) to

0
P ). But the size of the prize is aected by two eects working in opposite directions:
The prelaunch allows for some increase of the prize through concession benets, but
also leads to some shrinkage in its size due to the choice of the less ecient technology.
This latter eect is not present with symmetric types and Stackelberg leadership. So
the greater winner's share  required to induce a prelaunch serves as a kind of "built-in"
protection mechanism against the ineciency associated with pre-assigned roles and a
less ecient leading rm.We summarize our results on technological asymmetry with
Stackelberg leadership in Proposition 2:
21In case qj;T = qi;ti : we would obtain   
0
C =
1
2dj
dititi
+ 1, which is also less strict. However, with
continuous types there would be zero probability of this case. Hence, in the following we concentrate
on the case of qj;T > qi;ti .
16
Proposition 2 If the Stackelberg leader is the ecient rm, a prelaunch will take place
for smaller values of the loser's share. Conversely, for the specication of concession
benets we use, a prelaunch is feasible only for a smaller range of values of the winner's
share if the leading rm is less ecient, and the outcome is inecient since either the
inferior technology is chosen or concession benets are not realized. If the leading rm
is less ecient, there is a limit to the relative superiority of the follower's technology for
prelaunch and concession to take place.
P roof. See appendix.
The presence of pre-assigned roles (Stackelberg leadership) may create an ine-
ciency by not allowing the technologically stronger party to move rst and undertake a
prelaunch. This scenario diers from the symmetric case and the case where the more
ecient party is the Stackelberg leader where Stackelberg leadership serves as a bench-
mark because the equilibrium result is more ecient than without pre-assigned roles (as
will be shown in the following section). Such a scenario may seem counterintuitive at
rst { why would a less ecient rm be a Stackelberg leader? Given that rms will
develop many products in their existence however, this seems like a genuine possibility.
Stackelberg leadership may be determined from a broader context. Consider for exam-
ple a case where product (pre-)announcements are only credible by one player, but the
quality (i.e. development speed) of a particular technology may be high or low, so that
a Stackelberg leader may be developing the inferior technology.
3.2.2 Strategic Symmetry
As mentioned, Stackelberg leadership generates the ecient outcome unless the Stack-
elberg leader has an inferior technology. We will now analyze the incentive by rms to
preempt each other by prelaunching their technology in a scenario of strategic symmetry,
so that both rms can end up the leader but no roles are pre-assigned a priori. Again,
we start with the symmetric case for illustrative purposes and then analyze the changes
to the results if players are not (type-)symmetric.
Without pre-assigned roles, the players each have an incentive to preempt each other
by undertaking a prelaunch. At the same time, they have an incentive to wait as long as
possible before undertaking a prelaunch (see above). The incentive to preempt prevails
as long as the payo of the player that gets to succesfully prelaunch ((LPS)) is greater
than the payo of the player that ends up following ((F )), i.e. (LPS) > (F ) or
ti (M   ti)  1  , i.e. the concession condition holds, meaning that a prelaunch would
be successful. If the parameter constellation ofM ,  is such that the concession condition
is fullled from some time tmin onwards,
22 both players have an incentive to prelaunch
at tmin to avoid being preempted. On the other hand, if (LPS) < (F ) for all ti, no
22The LHS is increasing in ti, while the RHS is time-invariant, so that if  (LPS ) >  (F ) holds for
tmin, it holds for all ti > tmin.
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player will want to prelaunch. With strategic and type symmetry, we therefore obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If a prelaunch can be successful at any time during the interval, with
strategic and type symmetry there will be a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in prelaunch
times and identities. With probability 1
2
, player i prelaunches at the earliest protable
prelaunch time tmin and player j concedes immediately. The roles are reversed with
probability 1
2
.
P roof. See appendix.
This setting is comparable to Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), and in particular their
"Case A". Here, the leader's maximum payo is strictly greater than the payo from
simultaneous adoption (reinterpreted as the payo from both staying in). With contiuous
time, we rely on the assumption that a "mistake" in the sense of simultaneous prelaunch
is impossible and that therefore the question to be resolved is the identity of the leader,
but not the prelaunch time.
As a result, prelaunch and concession take place much earlier than in the Stackelberg
case (if they take place at all). Strategic symmetry creates incentives to preempt, which
results in an ineciency, since the prelaunch takes place at tmin rather than t
. To some
extent, this result is the "rent equalization" result in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
How does this result change if the players are dierent types? Being a stronger
type involves a tradeo. On one hand, prelaunching is feasible at an earlier time. On
the other hand, however, the opportunity cost from prelaunching are higher since the
remaining development time would be more protable. Assuming that a prelaunch is
protable to begin with, however, we can determine the identity of the prelaunching
rm:
Proposition 4 If the less ecient player's CC is ever satised, the more ecient player
always undertakes a prelaunch. The timining of this prelaunch depends on whether her
own CC is ever satised during the interval. If that is not the case, that is, the stronger
player's CC is never satised, the prelaunch will take place at the optimal time t. If the
stronger player's CC is satised during the interval, she will preluanch just before her
own CC is satised, that is, just before the weaker player would prelaunch. The prelaunch
time is strictly earlier in this case. An ineciency due to foregone technological progress
arises.
P roof. See appendix.
A number of interesting results emerge in comparison to the other cases. First,
the identity of the prelaunching party is determined endogenously { a stronger rm
prelaunches rst. Second, compared to the respective Stackelberg leader case, an ine-
ciency arises from the danger that the less ecient rm might undertake a prelaunch as
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well. This however will only restrict the leader's behaviour if the dierence in types is
not too large. This implies that a case arises where competition between unequal rivals
may be more ecient than between equal rivals.
3.2.3 Incomplete Information
Consider now the case where development speeds (i.e. types) are private information and
drawn independently from a continuous uniform distribution on the interval di;j 2 [0; 1].
A prelaunch will reveal a player's type. If no player undertakes a prelaunch until the
end of the game (T), both players' types are revealed at T and payos are allocated as
described above. With incomplete information, players do not know if they are the more
or less ecient type. Nevertheless, in eect one player will end up being the follower
(player j) and the other one being the leader (player i), unless both players stay in until
T .23
Suppose that rms have to (privately) commit themselves to a prelaunch time at the
start of the game. This seems reasonable given the considerable lead times required for
prelaunching a complex product and the milestones-based project planning approach
usually adopted for complex, long-term projects. We start by analyzing the follower's
(j) considerations. Given that the leader (i) has undertaken a prelaunch and thereby
revealed its type, player j decides, based on its private knowledge of its own type,
whether to stay in or concede. We derive the concession condition as a function of the
(revealed) leader's type di below. Player j concedes if j(C)  j(S),24 i.e.
qi;ttiti (1  )  qj;T  = dj if qj;T > qi;ti
We solve for a lower limit dj for j's development speed dj such that for dj > dj ,
player j decides to stay in after the prelaunch.25 We obtain the following concession
condition:
dj  dj =
dititi(1  )

=
diti(M   ti)(1  )

Turning to i's prelaunch condition, player i considers for each time ti 2 [0; T ] whether
to undertake a prelaunch at the respective time or not. This is based on the expected
payo from a prelaunch at ti, bi(P ) where PS reects the payo from a successful
prelaunch (i.e. followed by j's concession), PU the payo from an unsuccessful prelaunch,
23With a continuous, uniform distribution over types d, there is zero probability of di = dj , and,
hence, of a simultaneous prelaunch.
24S is strictly dominated by C in case j was not able to overtake or at least catch up with i's technology
(as revealed in the prelaunch) by T , i.e. qj;T < qi;ti .
25The inequality needs to be strict because of assumed weak preference for concession.
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andbmarks expected values.26 That is
bi(P ) = djbi(PS) + (1  dj)bi(PU)
= dj(dititi) + (1  dj)

1 + dj
2
T (1  )

= d2i t
2
i
2
ti
(1  ) +

1  dititi
(1  )

 
1 + dititi
(1 )

2
(1  )
!
With a uniform distribution of types and conservative expectation formation (i.e. no
additional exogenously given information on types and no Bayesian updating), we have:
bi(S) = d2i  + (1  di)[(1  )bdj] = d2i  + (1  di)[(1  )di + 12 ]:
We directly derive PC2 for a set of times from bi(P )  bi(S),27 or
d2i t
2
i
2
ti
(1  ) +

1  dititi
(1  )

 
1 + dititi
(1 )

2
(1  )
!
 d2i  + (1  di)[(1  )
di + 1
2
]
Dening di (1  ) = zi, using our specication of (t) =M t, and dening (titi) =
vti , we obtain
diziv
2
ti
+

1  zivti

1 + zivti

2
(1  )

 d2i  + (1  di)

di + 1
2
(1  )

We use a numerical example for illustration: We set  = 0:7, di = 0:8, and M = 3.
The lower bound dj as a function of the prelaunch time ti is then dj(ti) =
36
35
ti  1235t2i (see
Figure 2 below). The lower bound is increasing with prelaunch time, which indicates
that late prelaunches will be more likely (ceteris paribus) to be successful. The rival's
technology simply has less time to catch up, or, to put it dierently, the technological
progress sacriced by the prelaunching rm is smaller.
Turning now to the prelaunch condition PC2, we nd that given our parameter
values, the rst ti 2 [0; 1] that satises PC2 is (approx.) tminP;C = 0:59. In the following
26With a continuous, uniform distribution over types d, there is zero probability of di = dj , and,
hence, of a simultaneous prelaunch.
27As long as the other player has not undertaken a prelaunch before, C is not an available action
and, hence, not relevant for the comparison. In case, however, the other player has already undertaken
a prelaunch, the above reasoning for the follower applies.
20
Figure 2: dj as a function of the prelaunch time ti
panel, we compare this to the symmetric Stackelberg case (where di = dj = 0:8), the
case with strategic and type symmetry, and the "asymmetric types" case with strategic
symmetry but type asymmetry, where di = 0:8 and dj = 0:5 (equal to the expected
value of development speed).28
This results in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 With incomplete information, adoption times are earlier than the ef-
cient outcome. Also, second inecieny arises because players undertake prelaunches
that turn out to be unsuccessful.
P roof. Preliminary numerical illustration.
How does uncertainty aect a player's strategies? Clearly, a player will take into
account that prelaunching may not be successful, while in the complete information case
this would always be known. As a consequence, prelaunching is a more risky strategy,
which will aect its expected prots vis-a-vis the alternative of staying in. Generally,
two eects are at work: the incentive to preempt the other player, and the incentive to
wait in order to enhance success chances for a prelaunch. We nd in our preliminary
numerical illustration that the rst eect dominates. Uncertainty entraps players to
undertake prelaunches earlier and more often that would be ecient.
28All numbers are rounded.
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Figure 3: Scenario comparison
4 Discussion
4.1 The CD launch revisited
The success of the CD can be attributed to any number of factors { including of course
the signicant quality leap from analog audio systems, the successful targeting of two
distinct strata of music lovers, and nally the issues surrounding pre-introduction strate-
gies analyzed in our model. Settling on a standard obviously helped create expectations
on the part of consumers, but also on the part of hard- and software producers having
to invest signicantly in any new audio technology while taking the risk of cannibal-
izing their existing technology (McGahan, 1993). In our scenarios with complete and
incomplete information, the stronger rm consistently prelaunches the technology, and
the weaker rm concedes if it is not too strong and/or there are signicant benets from
joining the prelaunched standard.
Applying these results to our motivating case suggests that Sony/Philips' design
was the more ecient technology and that Matsushita gave up because they would not
have been able to catch up in the remaining time leading up to the DAD conference.
While it is impossible to analyze counterfactual cases where Matsushita prelaunched
rst or continued developing their own technology, anecdotal evidence suggests that
Matsushita's design had less potential than Sony/Philips' both in terms of technological
parameters and the potential linkup with software manufacturers. However, it appears
that a fully developed version might have been viable in the marketplace given that it
was approved at the DAD conference as well. It is also interesting to try and infer the
amount of information and the degree of strategic symmetry from the players' prelaunch
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behaviour. Given Sony/Philips' prelaunch took place a relatively long time before the
DAD conference, it seems that preemption played some role since a signicant amount
of technological progress was sacriced in order to establish a standard prior to the
conference. Consequently, it seems that strategic symmetry was the more likely scenario.
Further, Sony/Philips were active trying to bring other licensees on board and thus make
joining their standard more attractive for Matsushita, which would have been unlikely
if Sony/Philips had been certain (or suciently condent) that Matsushita would have
supported their standard anyway. Assuming network eects play a role already in the
licensing stage (a technology with more parties signed up is more likely to succeed, which
in turn makes it more attractive to join { thus strengthening the bargaining position of
the standard sponsors), this sequence of action seems to be inecient from Sony/Philips'
perspective since the bargaining power vis-a-vis potential licensees was lower than with
Matsushita on board. If, on the other hand, the support of other industry players was
deemed crucial to get Matsushita's support, sacricing bargaining power in exchange
for the higher likelihood of getting Matsushita to join seems plausible. Consequently, it
appears that there was a degree of uncertainty about the state of Matsushita's technology
and therefore their likely action.
4.2 Applicability of the model
Our model aims to capture some of the crucial features in the introduction of a new
technology. A technology develops over time, and although an earlier version of the
technology might be functional, improvements are still possible. Further, prelaunching
a technology captures a wide variety of actions where a technology's sponsor commits to
a certain product specication { for example, exhibiting a prototype at a fair, publishing
a set of specications (as in the case of the Compact Disc), or preannouncing technical
features could all be captured with the prelaunch strategy in our model. Likewise,
concession by rival technologies could imply the public endorsement of the prelaunched
technology, negotiations to ensure compatibility or even redirecting research eorts to
conform to the industry standard.
Apart from capturing the main tradeos in such a situation, we also assess the eects
of strategic asymmetry and incomplete information by analyzing three cases: Complete
information and either strategic asymmetry (Stackelberg leadership) or symmetry, and
the scenario with incomplete information. Clearly, rms will frequently attempt to
maintain secrecy over their research eorts, so that a priori we expect the incomplete
information case to be the most likely scenario. On the other hand, if there are signicant
knowledge spillovers regarding a technology or if players "know each other well" { for
example because they have been competing in related industries previously, the complete
information case may be more appropriate. This distinction is important in terms of the
results they generate { complete information typically yields more ecient results: On
the one hand, there will be no unsuccessful prelaunch, and on the other hand, prelaunch
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times (if there is a perlaunch at all) are typically closer to the ecient time. In other
words, the incentive to preempt is more important with incomplete information.
4.3 Firm implications
If standardization confers benets, but the gains are asymmetrically distributed, rms
face a "co-opetitive" situation. On one hand, rms have an interest in securing cooper-
ation with their rivals in order to increase the size of post-commercialization prots. On
the other hand, each rm wants their own standard chosen as the industry standard.
The fact that the binding constraint for a rm to initiate a prelaunch is the rival's con-
cession condition indicates that a rm would only be willing to "push through" their
standard if this is (likely to be) successful, which is conrmed in our analysis. How can
a rm inuence the likelihood of their prelaunch being successful? In our model, we
assume that , the winner's share, is exogenously given, but it is conceivable that the
sponsor of a standard can choose this, for example by implementing a liberal licensing
policy. In fact, from Figure 1 we can see that it is always possible for a Stackelberg
leader to choose a share  and an appropriate prelaunch time ti to ensure that the
follower always joins the standard.
An interesting set of results revolves around the incentives for strategic asymmetry.
In particular, in situations where the dierence between the winner's and the loser's share
is not too big (e.g. for liberally licensed technologies), it may be benecial for players to
settle on an order of moves so that the prot-maximizing prelaunch time ti will be chosen
rather than the inecient earlier time which erodes away some of the prots to be gained
from standardization. Agreeing on a Stackelberg leader resembles a Chicken game in
some ways. It is better to be the leader than the follower, but being the follower is better
than trying to preempt each other. We would therefore expect Stackelberg leadership
to emerge endogenously only in a very limited set of circumstances.29
5 Conclusion
Our model generates some interesting results on the incentives to prelaunch a developing
technology. However, a number of limitations and possible extensions should be noted.
Most of our extensions will refer to player's strategies and payos in the development
stage. This notwithstanding, we are aware that our modeling of the bargaining stage
is relatively restrictive. In ongoing work, we therefore intend to analyze an alternative
modeling strategy for bargaining outlined in footnote 15. Our main goal however is to
ensure the robustness of our results regarding our modeling strategy in the development
29In particular, in our model, pre-agreement on a Stackelberg leader would not be a stable agreement
for any  > 12 .
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stage. The following paragraphs outline some of the limitations and the corresponding
extensions in the development stage:
1. We currently use specic functional forms that allow us to derive explicit solutions
for launch times and the threshold values for the required (winner's and loser's)
share. We expect most of our results to remain intact with alternative specica-
tions or more general functional forms, but exploring this possibility is the subject
of future research. In particular, we expect that a more general specication of
(t), the prelaunch benets, will generate prelaunch times other than just prior
to the deadline. The assumption that even at t = T , there are still some benets
to conceding (and the gradient by which concession benets decrease in t) drives
these results.
2. Technological progress is deterministic (if not necessarily common knowledge) in
our model. This simplies our analysis at the expense of not accounting for one
observation in our motivating example { Matsushita did not concede immediately
after Sony/Philips had prelaunched their technology. With deterministic techno-
logical progress the follower knows immediately after the prelaunch if concession is
protable or not and consequently concedes immediately or stays in until the end.
If progress were random, it would be possible for the follower to continue develop-
ing its technology for some time until it becomes clear that submitting one's own
standard to the DAD conference would not be protable. This is likely to have
been a more realistic scenario regarding Matsushita's behaviour. With the sim-
ple specication we use, this is ignored, and incorporating stochastic technological
progress is another area of future research.
3. Finally, we also currently assume that in the incomplete information case, players
privately precommit to a prelaunch time. This is equivalent to assuming that
there is no Bayesian updating with incomplete information. Allowing for agents
to constantly update their beliefs about their rival's type would generate some
interesting dynamics in terms of players becoming more bullish about their type
compared to their rival's. Since stronger players will prelaunch at an earlier time,
as time passes the absence of a prelaunch indicates weakness on the part of the
players, which in turn feeds back on the incentives of initiating a prelaunch.
These limitations notwithstanding, we feel that our simple and stylized model of
prelaunch standardization manages to capture some of the mechanisms at play in such
a situation. We believe that the proposed extensions will be fruitful in terms of aligning
the model closer to reality, but we are condent that basic intuition of our initial results
will remain intact.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We introduce some additional notation. CCAY , PCAY refer to the asymmetric types
Stackelberg game, while CCSY , PCAY refer to the symmetric types Stackelberg game.
We analyze both cases in turn:
 The leader is the more ecient rm, i.e. di > dj. The concession condition CCAY
is less binding than in the symmetric case (CCSY )i.e. 
0
C > C . Less binding
means the follower will, all other things being equal, concede for high er winner's
shares . If 
0
C > C , we require that
diti (M   ti)
diti (M   ti) + dj >
ti (M   ti)
ti (M   ti) + 1 ,
or
ti (M   ti)
ti (M   ti) + djdi
>
ti (M   ti)
ti (M   ti) + 1
which holds since
dj
di
< 1.
 The leader is less ecient rm, i.e. di < dj : The concession condition CCAY is
more strict than in the symmetric types case (CCSY ), i.e. 
00
C < C . The follower
will, all other things being equal, concede only for smaller winner's shares . If

00
C < C , we require that
diti (M   ti)
diti (M   ti) + dj <
ti (M   ti)
ti (M   ti) + 1,
or
diti (M   ti) + di
diti (M   ti) + dj < 1,
which holds since by denition for the asymmetric case dj > di. Turning to the
prelaunch condition, we compare the asymmetric and symmetric type cases and
obtain the following relationship (dening (titi) = x):

00
P =
dj
dititi + dj
Q P =
1
2titi
,
or, noting the reversal in signs,
1 R x(2  di
dj
),
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where di
dj
< 1 and (2  di
dj
) > 1 but x can take any value without further restrictions
on either ti;or ti and M , respectively. However, for  =M   t, ti = T = 1 which yields
1 < (M   1)(2  di
dj
), 00P > P
since M > 2.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
[TO BE COMPLETED.]
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
From proposition 1 we know that the CC is the binding constraint as opposed to PC. We
concentrate on the relevant concession conditions and derive and compare them below.
Players ahve dierent types, i.e. di 6= dj, and no roles are pre-assigned. We assume that
dj < di and start by deriving the weaker player's (j) concession condition CCj given
that player i has undertaken a prelaunch at time ti and player j has not undertaken a
prelaunch up to or at ti. We require that j(C)  j(S), or
) (1 )qi;titi  j(S) =
8><>:
(a) (1  )qi;ti if qj;T < qi;ti , dj < diti , didj > 1ti
(b) qj;T if qj;T > qi;ti , dj > diti , didj < 1ti
(c) 1
2
qj;T =
1
2
qi;ti if qj;T = qi;ti , dj = diti , didj = 1ti
With zero probability for case (c), we concentrate on cases (a) and (b) in the following
argumentation. Case (a) is trivial since immediate concession strictly dominates staying
in. The (relative) superiority of i 's technological development speed is so strong that
player j cannot catch up until T with player i 's technology (as revealed and xed at ti).
For case (b) we derive the concession condition CCj from
(1  )qi;titi  qj;T , (1  )dititi  dj
as
,   Cj =
dititi
dititi + dj
) Cj =
diti(M   ti)
diti(M   ti) + dj ; and
, di
dj
 
(1  )titi
) di
dj
 
(1  )ti(M   ti)
We have timin = min(Vj) as the rst time at which the respective CCj holds when
Vj  [0; T ] is the set of all times during the interval at which CCj holds. So if the
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(relative) advantage in player i 's technological development speed is small enough as to
allow player j to overtake until T provided he stays in, the choice between conceding
and staying in depends on the net result from two tradeos: (S) earns j a larger share of
the prize. (C) earns j a smaller share and implies some foregone increase in technological
quality (since the relevant technology for determining the size of the prize in this case
is player i 's technology at ti, not player j ' s technology at T, and qj;T > qi;ti). However,
(C) increases the prize by the concession benets, ti .
Now we turn to the stronger player's (i) CCi (qi;T > qj;tj8t 2 [0; T ]). Given player j
prelaunches at time tj and player i has not undertaken a prelaunch up to or at tj, then
we derive CCi from i(C)  i(S) as
(1  )qj;tjtj  qi;T , (1  )djtjtj  di
,   Ci =
djtjtj
djtjtj + di
) Cj =
djtj(M   tj)
djtj(M   tj) + di ; and
, di
dj
 (1  )tjtj

) di
dj
 (1  )tj(M   tj)

.
Note that cases (a) and (c) as above are not possible for di > dj and player i
undertaking a prelaunch.
By comparing CCj and CCi we obtain the following results:
Case (a): If for a given time t 2 [0; T ] CCj holds, this implies that qj;T < qi;ti ) CCi
cannot possibly hold.
Case (b): For given (t); M , respectively,and di > dj, the earliest time for which CCi
holds (tjmin), and hence the rst time at which the (weaker) player j would undertake a
prelaunch, is greater than the earliest time for which CCj holds (timin). Since we have:
for CCi :
di
dj
 (1  )tj(M   tj)

, di
dj

(1  )  tj(M   tj)
for CCj :
di
dj
 
(1  )ti(M   ti) ,
dj
di

(1  )  ti(M   ti)
from which we obtain (because di > dj)
ti(M   ti) < tj(M   tj), t2j   t2i < M(tj   ti)
) for tj > ti:
t2j   t2i
tj   ti < M
) for tj < ti: .
t2j   t2i
tj   ti > M
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Since M > 2, and
t2j t2i
tj ti  2 for t 2 [0; 1]; tj < ti, the second inequality cannot hold.
The rst inequality can hold and hence, tj > ti:
Case (c): CCj holds at exactly one time ti with either ti = T , or ti < T . In the
latter case, there is at least one later time t0i = T for which
di
dj
> 1
T
= 1 holds (see case
(a)). As a result, player i would wait until t0i > ti before undertaking the prelaunch and
getting share . Along the lines of case (b), we then have ti < t
0
i < tj which prevents
player j from undertaking a prelaunch rst.
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